Please be advised that this website is evidence in a federal lwsuit

 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JAMES DAMIANO,
Plaintiff,

v.

BOB DYLAN, and SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 95-4795 (JBS)

 

10/19/2026

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PlAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR FRAUD UPON THE COURT & PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO VACATE OR MODIFY THE AUGUST 6, 1996 (post litigation) PROTECTIVE ORDER (AND ANY CONTINUING POST-JUDGMENT RESTRICTIONS) DESIGNATING ALL DISCOVERY MATERIALS CONFIDENTIAL.​

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Plaintiff James Damiano respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and the Court’s inherent authority to modify or vacate protective orders, for an order lifting, vacating, or substantially modifying the broad protective order entered by Magistrate Judge Joel B. Rosen on August 6, 1996 (reported at Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1996)). That order designated all discovery materials — including deposition transcripts, videotapes, expert reports, and related documents — as confidential. The order has continued to operate as a de facto permanent gag more than thirty years after the litigation concluded.

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The case was dismissed on summary judgment in December 1996 (Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 623 (D.N.J. 1996)), reconsideration was denied, and the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal in 1998. Subsequent contempt proceedings against Plaintiff for alleged violations of the order occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

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Nearly three decades have now passed. The original justifications for secrecy — primarily Defendants’ asserted interest in preventing commercial exploitation of discovery materials and protecting Bob Dylan’s privacy and reputation during active litigation — have long since dissipated. Continued enforcement of the order indefinitely serves no legitimate protective purpose and instead functions as an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech about a matter of significant public interest involving a world-famous public figure and allegations of artistic appropriation in the music industry.

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Legal Standard for Modification or Vacatur of a Protective Order

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Federal courts retain continuing jurisdiction to modify or vacate protective orders even after the underlying litigation has ended. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 784–90 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit applies a flexible balancing test that weighs the original “good cause” showing under Rule 26(c) against intervening changes in circumstances, the public’s interest in access to judicial records and information, First Amendment considerations, and the continuing need (if any) for confidentiality.

 

 

Key Factors

 

• Whether the original justification for the order remains valid;

• The passage of time;

• The public interest in the information;

• Whether the materials involve a public figure or matter of public concern;

• The burden on free speech and the right to petition;

• Whether less restrictive alternatives exist.

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Once the litigation ends, the presumption shifts more strongly toward disclosure, particularly where the order was entered on a blanket “good cause” basis rather than after particularized showings of harm for specific documents. Courts routinely lift or modify protective orders years after judgment when the original privacy or competitive concerns have become stale. See, e.g., cases applying Pansy factors post-judgment.

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Argument

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I. The Original Justification for the Protective Order No Longer Exists.

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The 1996 protective order was entered primarily because Defendants argued that Plaintiff intended to commercially exploit discovery materials (including deposition testimony) through websites, books, or other publications, and that unrestricted dissemination would harm Bob Dylan’s privacy and reputation while the case was pending. Magistrate Judge Rosen found good cause under Rule 26(c) after balancing the parties’ interests.

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Those circumstances have fundamentally changed:

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• The litigation has been closed for approximately thirty years. Summary judgment was granted in 1996; the appeal was dismissed in 1998. There is no longer any pending trial, ongoing discovery, or risk of tainting a jury pool.

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• Any commercial interest Plaintiff may have had in the materials is now historical. The passage of three decades has eliminated the urgency of any claimed commercial exploitation concern that existed in 1996–1999.

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• Bob Dylan is a global cultural icon and public figure of the highest order. Allegations concerning the origins of his songwriting, access to materials submitted to his record label, and the creative process surrounding songs such as “Dignity” are matters of legitimate public and historical interest. Courts recognize that public figures enjoy reduced expectations of privacy regarding professional activities, particularly those already the subject of extensive public commentary and litigation.

 

 

• Defendants themselves previously acknowledged (as reflected in court records) that Plaintiff retained the right to speak about his claims and his own version of events, so long as he did not disclose the protected discovery materials themselves. The protective order was never intended as a permanent lifetime gag on discussion of the underlying facts or Plaintiff’s own experiences.

 

Continued secrecy long after the case’s conclusion converts a temporary discovery management tool into a permanent restraint on speech without on going justification.

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II. The Passage of Thirty Years Constitutes a Material Change in Circumstances Warranting Relief Courts routinely recognize that the passage of substantial time weakens or extinguishes the need for continued confidentiality. Privacy interests that may have justified secrecy in 1996 (protecting a celebrity defendant from contemporaneous publicity during active litigation) are attenuated after three decades. Deposition testimony taken in the mid-1990s concerning events from the 1980s is now historical. Any residual privacy interest is outweighed by the strong public interest in access to information about high-profile copyright disputes involving iconic works.

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Moreover, Plaintiff has already been subjected to multiple contempt proceedings and sanctions for alleged violations. The deterrent purpose of the order has been fully served. Permanent enforcement decades later is punitive rather than protective.

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III. Continued Enforcement Raises Serious First Amendment Concerns.

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The protective order operates as a prior restraint on Plaintiff’s ability to discuss, quote, or publicly analyze discovery materials obtained in a federal civil case involving a major public figure and significant cultural works. Prior restraints on speech are heavily disfavored. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). While protective orders during litigation can be justified, their indefinite post-judgment continuation requires a particularly strong showing of continuing harm.

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Plaintiff retains a First Amendment right to speak about his own experiences, the claims he asserted, the court’s rulings (including the acceptance for purposes of summary judgment of certain access allegations), and matters of public concern involving artistic originality and the music industry. The order’s continued breadth — covering all discovery materials without particularized ongoing justification — chills that speech. Courts have recognized that parties should not be permanently silenced about litigation in which they participated, especially after the case has long ended.

 

IV. Public Interest and Judicial Transparency Strongly Favor Disclosure or Substantial Modification.

 

There is a strong public interest in the transparency of federal court proceedings, particularly those involving copyright claims against one of the most influential songwriters of the twentieth century. The materials at issue include deposition testimony of Bob Dylan and related discovery that bear on questions of access, solicitation of materials by Dylan, the record company, and the creative process. These are matters of historical and cultural significance.

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Blanket protective orders that remain in place indefinitely after judgment undermine public confidence in the judicial process. Modification or vacatur would allow the public, scholars, journalists, and Plaintiff himself to examine the full record without the artificial barrier of a thirty-year-old confidentiality designation whose original purpose has expired.

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V. Less Restrictive Alternatives Exist

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Even if the Court concludes that some limited residual protection remains appropriate (for example, with respect to any truly private personal information unrelated to the professional claims), the current blanket order is vastly overbroad. The Court can:

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• Vacate the order in its entirety;

• Limit remaining confidentiality to specific categories of genuinely private information (if any still exist);

• Permit disclosure of deposition transcripts and related materials subject only to ordinary copyright or privacy constraints that apply to all citizens; or

• Enter a narrowly tailored order that expressly preserves Plaintiff’s right to discuss the case, his claims, and non-confidential aspects of the record.

A complete or near-complete lifting of the order is the appropriate remedy given the extreme passage of time.

 

Conclusion

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For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff James Damiano respectfully requests that this Court enter an order vacating or substantially modifying the August 6, 1996 Protective Order (and any continuing post-judgment restrictions derived from it), so that Plaintiff may freely discuss, publish, and analyze the discovery materials obtained in this long-concluded litigation without further threat of contempt. The original justifications for secrecy have evaporated with the passage of thirty years. Continued enforcement serves no 

 

legitimate protective purpose and improperly restrains speech on a matter of public interest involving a major cultural figure.

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FRAUD UPON THE COURT

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Comparing Bob Dylan’s attorney Orin Snyder’s statements, pleadings and submissions to the videotaped deposition  recorded during discovery in this litigation it is blatantly obvious that he has lied to the court over and over again establishing a massive fraud upon the court.

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This fraud upon the court can be reviewed on this website 

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Submitted October 19th, 2026

 

I James Damiano certify that I have served a copy of my motion for Fraud Upon The Court & Motion To Vacate the August 6th, 1996 (post litigation) protective order to Orin Snyder of Gibson Dunn, Judge Renee Bumb United States District Court and the clerks office for third circuit, United States District Court on October 19th, 2026

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